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Abstract: 
In his critical notice entitled ‘An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness?’ 
focusing on my article that was previously published in this journal, Fred Feldman raises an 
important objection to a suggestion I made about how to best formulate the whole life 
satisfaction theories of happiness. According to my proposal, happiness is a matter of whether 
an idealised version of you would judge that your actual life corresponds to the life-plan, which 
he or she has constructed for you on the basis of your cares and concerns. Feldman argues that 
either the idealised version will include in the relevant life-plan only actions that are possible 
for you to do or he or she will also include actions and outcomes that are not available for you 
in the real world. He then uses examples to argue that both of these alternatives have 
implausible consequences. In response to this objection, I argue that what it is included in the 
relevant life-plan depends on what you most fundamentally desire and that this constraint is 
enough to deal with Feldman’s new cases.  
 
Keywords: happiness, whole life satisfaction, Fred Feldman, conditional fallacy  
 
1. Introduction 
It seems clear that happy people are satisfied with their lives – they must surely appreciate how 
well their lives are going. There is a long philosophical tradition of developing this simple 
observation into a full-blown theory of happiness.1 According to the resulting ‘Whole Life 
Satisfaction’ theories (hereafter ‘WLS theories’), being happy is, in some way to be specified 
further, a matter of judging that your life compares well with your life-plan and especially a 
matter of feeling satisfied as a consequence. 
 
In an earlier article and in his recent book on happiness, Fred Feldman makes a powerful 
objection to the WLS theories that challenges their very fundamental structure (Feldman, 2008 
and 2010, ch. 5). It has the form of a dilemma. The objection begins from the idea that either 
we have to accept an actualist or a hypotheticalist version of the WLS theories. It then argues 
                                                        
1 For a list of references, see Suikkanen (2011, p. 150 fn. 6). 
that, whichever way we choose, we are led to implausible conclusions concerning how happy 
different agents are. The most basic, actualist versions of WLS theories make the happiness of 
a person depend on an actual judgment which that person must make about how well her life 
is going compared to her life-plan. The problem here, however, is that many of us are so 
immersed in our daily activities that we have little time to form any life-plans or consider how 
well our actual lives would compare to them. And, yet we do not want to claim that we are 
necessarily for this reason unhappy. 
 
To avoid this problem, the WLS theorists could suggest that perhaps our happiness is instead 
a function of how well we would judge our lives compared to our life-plans if we were to form 
such plans and considered how well our lives match those plans. Yet, Feldman’s insight is that 
this kind of hypotheticalist accounts are flawed too. A spontaneous person who is forced to 
form life-plans and compare her new reflective life to it in the counterfactual condition is likely 
to judge that her life is now not going according to her plan as she had no intention to form 
life-plans or engage in self-reflection in the first place.  
 
The point of my previous article in this journal (Suikkanen, 2011) was to investigate whether 
the WLS theories could be structured in a way that would enable them to avoid the previous 
dilemma. My diagnosis of Feldman’s wonderful objection was that it revealed that the 
hypotheticalist WLS account committed the so-called conditional fallacy.2 These views 
attempt to capture happiness in terms of subjunctive conditionals: what you would judge, if 
you were in certain circumstances. However, putting you into the relevant counter-factual 
conditions changes your life in the relevant respects and so the judgments you make about your 
own life in those circumstances have little relevance with respect to how happy you are in your 
actual life. 
 
At this point, I noticed that similar conditional fallacies have recently been committed 
elsewhere in ethics, for example in the debates concerning practical reasons where it has been 
suggested that we should understand reasons in terms of what we would desire if we were fully 
rational.3 The lesson of these debates has been that this doesn’t work: making you fully rational 
changes your situation in a way that makes your desires in that new situation irrelevant to the 
reasons you actually have in the real world where you are not as rational (Smith, 1995, p. 111). 
These analogical debates gave me hope. In that context, Michael Smith has found a way of 
                                                        
2 This type of fallacies was first made famous by Shope (1978). 
3 See, e.g., Brandt (1979, ch. 1). 
avoiding the conditional fallacy. In order to give an account of what reasons you actually have, 
Smith (1995, sec. 1) formulated a distinct evaluating perspective from which an idealised 
version of you has certain desires with regards to what the real version of you is to do in the 
evaluated actual world where you remain the same. In this case, the idealising changes made 
to the desires of your idealised version cannot change the features of the evaluated actual 
situation and so the conditional fallacy is avoided.  
 
I used a similar strategy to construct a new structure for the WLS views that could enable the 
resulting views to avoid the conditional fallacy horn of Feldman’s dilemma (Suikkanen, 2011, 
sec 5–6). This strategy relied on drawing the distinction between the actual person in the real 
world whose happiness is being evaluated and the idealised version of this person who is a 
theoretical construct responsible for forming an ideal life-plan on the basis of the person’s cares 
and concerns and making a judgment of how well that person’s real life conforms to the 
hypothetical life-plan. This enables the WLS views to avoid the problem of the happiness of 
spontaneous people as the individuals who are happily immersed in their activities can continue 
to do just that. All the view requires is that their evaluating version comes to judge that there 
is a match between the life-plan she constructs out of the real person’s cares and concerns and 
the real person’s actual life. This kind of advice model versions of the WLS theories then have 
the right structure to avoid Feldman’s powerful objection that seemed fatal to the more 
traditional WLS-views. 
 
I still think that this is exactly right and nothing in Feldman’s critical notice gives me reason 
to think otherwise (see Feldman 2019). The objection he puts forward does not challenge the 
idea that the advice model views have the right structure to avoid his previous objections to the 
hypotheticalist versions of the WLS theories. In fact, as we will see below, Feldman’s new 
objections do not even turn on the advice model structure, as similar objections can be made 
to all versions of the WLS theories. I also want to emphasise that, in the original article, I only 
presented the advice model as a flexible framework in which different versions that have 
different extensions can be formulated (Suikkanen, 2011, sec. 6.1). In this respect, I was 
inspired by the recent debates about consequentialism in which it has been suggested that 
different versions of consequentialism share the same structure even if they can come to very 
different conclusions about which actions are right as a result of adopting different theories of 
value.4 In the same spirit, I thought that different versions of the advice model WLS theory, 
                                                        
4 For an overview of these consequentializing debates, see Portmore (2009). 
which have different extensions, can be formulated by specifying the idealised version of the 
person whose happiness is being evaluated in different ways. 
 
Perhaps I was not clear enough about this in my original article. This is shown by the fact that 
Feldman’s objections make certain substantial assumptions of how exactly I would specify the 
idealised evaluator and the resulting version of the advice model. It was, however, never my 
intention to be so ambitious in my article. I assumed that finding out which version of the 
advice model turns out to be true should be done at a later stage by relying on the reflective 
equilibrium method.5 We could begin from certain intuitive assumptions according to which 
the idealised evaluator has a more coherent version of the evaluated person’s set of desires, 
goals, intentions, cares and concerns and he or she is also perhaps more informed too. I thought 
that we can then compare the consequences of this basic view’s verdicts of which agents are 
happy to our own intuitions about different cases. If we find conflicts between the two, we can 
then both go back to re-evaluate our views of the idealised evaluator and also fine-tune our 
intuitions about the cases until we reach a reflective equilibrium.  
 
It is then fortunate that exactly the kind of cases which Feldman’s describes in his critical notice 
allow us to apply the previous method and thus learn more about the advice model and 
happiness. In these cases, Feldman specifies agents who are intuitively either happy or 
unhappy. His intention is to present these cases as ones in which my advice model version of 
the WLS theory comes to wrong conclusions. However, the way I understand these cases is 
that they enable us to get a sense of how we should best understand the idealised evaluator. I 
will conclude this response to Feldman by illustrating how this works. 
 
2. Feldman’s New Cases 
Consider Smoky first (Feldman 2019, sec. 3): 
 
Smoky smoked like a chimney for many years. Eventually it caught up with him and 
his health has been ruined. Now, as he lies on his deathbed at t, Smoky is miserable. 
He does best to cope with his fatal illness, but he cannot undo the mistakes of his 
youth… He is miserable. He deeply regrets the now unalternable errors of his past. 
 
                                                        
5 See Rawls (1971, 19–21 and 46–51). 
If we are to have a plausible version of the advice model, it better not entail that Smoky is 
happy. Feldman, however, seems to suggest that my view will entail that he is. One reason for 
this is that Feldman assumes that the relevant life plan created by Smoky+ will consist of some 
actions which Smoky must do in order to be happy and which he cannot do.  
 
This, however, never was a part of the view. I took the idea of life plans from John Kekes’s 
brilliant 1982 article ‘Happiness’. As Kekes puts it, a ‘life-plan is the hierarchical ordering of 
the first-order wants’ (Kekes, 1981, p. 364). On this view, we have first-order desires for 
different outcomes – for our lives to have different general qualities. We then have to decide 
what role these wants are to have in our lives – we must make a commitment. These decisions 
then together amount to a life-plan that orders one’s cares and concerns in terms of their 
importance. This is what also happens when an actual individual constructs a life-plan and what 
I assumed likewise happens when the ideal versions of us construct life-plans for us on the 
basis of the first-order desires they have inherited from us. 
 
At this point, I believe we can assume that some of the fundamental wants the real Smoky has 
are health, long life, taking part in the activities that he likes which he cannot do when ill and 
so on. So, if Smoky+ constructs a life-plan for Smoky on the basis of ordering all his wants in 
terms how much they matter to Smoky, that life-plan will presumably give a central place to 
having those very things, which Smoky deeply cares about. Because of this, Smoky+ is 
unlikely to judge that Smoky’s life matches well with his life-plan and so it looks like there are 
versions of the advice model that come to the correct conclusions about this case. 
 
Feldman’s next case is the following (Feldman, 2019, sec. 4): 
Luckless… was born with a congenital condition that has made his life miserable. 
Suppose Luckless has done his best to cope with it, but to no avail. … But of course he 
is not [outstandingly happy]. 
In this case too Feldman suggests that the advice model theories will imply in an objectionable 
way that the miserable Luckless is outstandingly happy. This is because he speculates that, 
when Luckless+ makes a life-plan for Luckless, he will probably leave the unalterable 
components of Luckless’s actual life in place and so the ideal life-plan for Luckless will contain 
all the misfortunes of his actual life. This is why Luckless’s life will compare well with the 
ideal-life plan and so the view will deem him happy. 
 
Here I do not believe that the plausible versions of the advice model will have this consequence 
for the same reasons as in Smoky’s case. I assume that many of Luckless’s most fundamental 
and deepest wants, cares and concerns have to do with living a life free on pain, being able to 
do things that he knows he would enjoy and so on. This is because a very good explanation of 
why Luckless feels so miserable is that he cannot get what he most desires. If these are 
Luckless’s most fundamental wants, then presumably they will play an essential role in the 
life-plan which Luckless+ constructs for him. This is why I believe Luckless+ would not come 
to judge that Luckless’s life is going according to his life-plan and so there are versions of the 
advice model that agree with Feldman about what we should say about this case too. 
 
Feldman argues, however, that the previous response makes the advice model unable to deal 
with his final case, Mr. Chipper (Feldman, 2019, sec. 4): 
Suppose Mr. Chipper wants to be healthy, wealthy, and wise. Suppose he knows that 
he has always been healthy, wealthy, and wise. Suppose as a result that he is satisfied 
with his life as a whole. Mr. Chipper might like to be healthier, wealthier, and wiser … 
[b]ut he knows that in virtue of his extraordinary health, wealth, and wisdom, no 
improvement in these areas is possible. He is as healthy, wealthy, and wise as a person 
could be… He is very happy. 
Feldman claims that the advice model cannot lead to this conclusion because in the previous 
example Luckless+ includes things in Luckless’s life-plan that are not possible for him to 
obtain. So, Feldman suggests that Mr. Chipper+ will have to do the same. He too will form a 
life-plan for Mr. Chipper that will include taking the imaginary supplements that make him 
even more healthy, making the imaginary investments that make him amazingly wealthy, and 
taking the brain enhancing pills that make him even wiser. On the basis of this life-plan, Mr. 
Chipper+ will then come to judge that Mr. Chipper’s life is not going according to plan. This 
would make him an unhappy person according to the advice model, which he is not. 
 
Here the challenge is to explain in a principled way why Chipper+ would not include these 
impossible actions in Mr. Chipper’s life-plan. This explanation must also still enable us to 
continue to claim that Luckless’s life-plan will include things that he just cannot obtain. This 
challenge does not seem too difficult to me. If we consider Luckless, it is intuitive that many 
of his most fundamental and deepest actual cares and concerns are directed at living a pain-
free life and also a life that allows him to take part in many of the important human activities 
that are not currently available for him. It is then plausible to think that Luckless+ takes the 
fundamentality and centrality of these cares and concerns into account in formulating the life-
plan for Luckless.  
 
Yet, the way in which Feldman describes Mr. Chipper makes it clear that his most fundamental 
cares and concerns have absolutely nothing to do with being even healthier, wealthier, and 
wiser. As Feldman puts it, Mr. Chipper merely ‘might like to be healthier, wealthier and wiser’ 
(Feldman, 2019, sec. 4). If these desires are in this way mere wishes or peripheral fleeting 
desires, then it’s not clear to me that they would play a role in Mr. Chipper+’s hypothetical 
life-plan for Mr. Chipper. This is exactly because the whole point of the life-plan is to structure 
Mr. Chipper’s actual wants in terms of how central a role they play in his psychological make-
up. As a result, Mr. Chipper+ would not judge that Mr. Chipper’s life is not going according 
to his life-plan merely because these further wishes are not satisfied in his actual life.6  
 
This makes me think that the solution to these new cases does not really have anything to do 
with whether the idealised agents should include either only possible actions and outcomes in 
the life-plans or also things which the actual agents cannot do or achieve. Rather, the life-plans 
are better understood in terms of what kind of outcomes the agents themselves want most – 
what kind of generic qualities the agents fundamentally want their lives to have. And, as the 
last two examples show, it is important to emphasise the fact that, when the ideal versions of 
the evaluated agents make life-plans for those agents, they will take into account how central 
role the different cares and concerns out of which the life-plans are constructed play in the 
agents’ psychologies. Furthermore, the ideal versions of the agents will also, in judging how 
well an agent’s life matches up to her life-plan, focus on whether the agent’s life satisfies her 
core cares and concerns. If the more peripheral elements of the agent’s motivational set are left 
unsatisfied this will not make the agent’s ideal version judge that the agent’s life is not going 
according to her life-plan.7  
                                                        
6 It could be objected that a version of Chipper could actually ultimately desire more health, wealth and wisdom 
than he currently has and what he believes is achievable for him. In this case, his ideal version might include these 
seemingly impossible goods in his life-plan and judge that the actual life of Chipper does not match up to that 
plan. In this case, the proposed view would entail that this version of Chipper is unhappy. However, given that 
the ultimate desires of this Chipper are frustrated, and he is aware of this, this sounds like a plausible conclusion 
to draw. Of course, it is true that many agents tend to desire less those things that they believe are impossible for 
them to achieve (but this is not always the case – see Smoky’s case above). This seems to fit the way in which 
many empirical life satisfaction studies have found evidence of adaptation (see, e.g., Luhmann et al (2012)). 
7 Of course, this still leaves many interesting questions about the proposal open. For example, we can construct 
different versions of the view by varying exactly which fundamental desires should be taken into account by the 
ideal version of the agent. Some agents change their fundamental desires and so the question is whether their ideal 
versions should, in the construction of the life-plan, only take into account their actual version’s current desires 
or rather some set of the ultimate desires both before and after the change. Views that take a different stand on 
this issue will disagree about which agents are happy. The hope would be to use the kind reflective equilibrium 
 
It seems to me that this is all we need to say in order to defend the advice model against 
Feldman’s new challenge. Despite this, I am still extremely thankful for Feldman’s new cases 
as they have helped us to get closer to how we should understand the ideal versions of the 
agents in the advice model and what their role is. 
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methodology illustrated here to discover what the most plausible version of the view is in this respect too but 
carrying out this work will have to be left for another occasion. 
